War History Online presents this Guest Article by Thomas D. Pilsch
With great solemnity and reverence, America observed the 75th anniversary of the devastating December 7th, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor that thrust the nation into World War II. There was little recognition, however, of the anniversary of a second highly consequential attack on that strategic Pacific base by the Japanese Navy on March 4, 1942, less than three months later.
The story of the first attack on Pearl Harbor — President Roosevelt’s “date which will live in infamy” — is a familiar one. At 7:55 AM on a Sunday morning, over 350 Japanese planes launched in two waves from aircraft carriers north of Hawaii bombed the airfields and fleet anchorage on the island of Oahu.
The Japanese achieved complete surprise with results beyond their expectation. All eight of the battleships in the U.S. Pacific battle squadron were hit. Four of them were sunk with two, USS Arizona and USS Oklahoma, total losses. The island’s air defenses were devastated. The greatest loss of all was the 2,403 Americans – Army, Navy, Marines and civilians — who died in this attack.
Japan had won a stunning victory in this first attack. The raid had achieved its objective of disabling the US Pacific fleet to give Japan a free hand in its planned conquest of Southeast Asia and the East Indies. This, they thought, would allow the Empire to secure resources needed to establish preeminence in Asia and the Pacific. Tokyo reasoned that by the time the U.S. was able to rebuild its fleet, the Japanese position in the Pacific would be so secure that Washington would have no choice but to accept this fait accompli.
History ultimately was to prove Japan’s Pearl Harbor victory a pyrrhic one. Its leaders had not anticipated that an enraged America would dedicate itself to training retribution upon the home islands and would entertain no consideration of negotiation.
Early in 1942, Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) leaders began to have second thoughts about missed opportunities in the Pearl Harbor strike. By chance, the two Pearl-based aircraft carriers were delivering aircraft to U.S. island possessions and were untouched. More significant to America’s war effort in the Pacific was the value of the fuel supplies and undamaged shipyard, particularly the large dry docks. Without these, the damaged U.S. ships could not have been repaired and supported. The remaining fleet would have had to operate from the West Coast. With the facilities intact, pressure on the IJN might build sooner than desired.
Historians continue to debate the decision of the Japanese force commander, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, not to launch an unplanned third wave to destroy the Pearl Harbor facilities in lieu of withdrawing to the north as he did. He had accomplished his objective of disabling the U.S. fleet and was uncertain of the location of the two U.S. aircraft carriers. A third wave would have necessitated a risky night recovery of the attack force. Most dangerous of all, Nagumo would have had to break radio silence to coordinate the refueling of his fleet for the changed plan.
With the IJN committed to its southwestern Pacific strategy, there were few viable options to revisit Hawaii in early 1942. Nevertheless, the IJN general staff approved a plan for a small reconnaissance and bombing raid against the highest value target, the large dry docks in the Pearl Harbor shipyard.
The raid would be conducted by a new, long-range flying boat patrol bomber, the Kawanishi H8K (Allied reporting name Emily). First flown in early 1941, the aircraft was just completing development a year later, and only the two prototypes were available for a second Pearl Harbor attack, coded named Operation K.
The Emilys would require refueling to fly from a forward Japanese base to Oahu. This refueling would be conducted from submarines in the sheltered waters of French Frigate Shoals, an uninhabited atoll 500 miles northwest of Pearl Harbor.
While Japan had experimented with refueling of seaplanes from submarines, there is a strong belief that the details of Operation K were suggested in a novella serialized in The Saturday Evening Post in 1941. Written by then-Navy Reserve intelligence officer Lieutenant Wilfred Jay Holmes in 1940 under the nom de plume Alec Hudson, the manuscript was eventually cleared by Naval Intelligence, and the story “Rendezvous” was published as two installments in August 1941.
In Holmes’ fictional account, U.S. Navy PBY Catalina flying boats attacked an “enemy” in the Western Pacific after refueling from submarines at an uninhabited atoll 1,000 miles from the target. The similarity to the Operation K plan is undeniable.
Fog of War
The IJN deployed four large I-class submarines to support the operation. Two were to enter French Frigate Shoals to refuel the Emilys. A third was to stand offshore as a backup and to guard the approach to the anchorage. The fourth submarine was to patrol just south of Pearl to provide weather reports and rescue support if needed, but it disappeared without trace en route to its patrol point and never provided weather information.